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Abstract 
 
After almost a decade of nationalist HDZ rule in Croatia, the change of 
government in 2000 brought pro-minority governance and concrete 
implementation of minority rights legislation. In 2003, when a reformed HDZ 
came to power, the new government declared that the unconditional return of 
all refugees, regardless of their ethnicity and the return of their property 
constitutes the priority of its mandate. This shift in the treatment of minorities, 
particularly the Serb minority which is the second largest ethnic community in 
the country, is closely linked to the fact of the country’s key foreign policy 
priority of joining the European Union. Since the current government is striving 
to legitimize its mandate by supporting the country’s entry into the European 
Union, the state is obliged to comply with all conditionality policies pursued by 
the Union, including respect for and protection of minorities. 
This paper examines how the issue of minority protection was perceived and 
realized in Croatia in thirteen years of the country’s independence by tracing 
amendments in Croatian legislation for minority protection. The paper 
emphasises that even though the potential accession to the European Union has 
motivated politicians to publically advocate the proper inclusion of minorities, 
the majority of Croatians remain reluctant to accept the need for minority 
protection. The domestic legislative framework has been brought in line with 
international minority protection standards, and implementation of minority 
rights has become more active. Nevertheless, the absence of broad acceptance 
of minorities constitutes major obstacle for the true realization of minority 





Antonija Petričušić holds a MA in Human Rights and Democratization from 
University of Sarajevo and University of Bologna, and a BA in Law from University 
of Zagreb. She currently works as a researcher at the European Academy of 
Bolzano. Among her key research interests are the accommodation of minorities 
and regional cooperation in the Western Balkans. She has published articles on 
the protection of national minorities in Croatia and Slovenia, as well as on 
European Union conditionality policy regarding regional cooperation and minority 
protection in South East Europe. For details see http://www.eurac.edu/about/ 
collaborators/APetricusic/index.htm.  
 





Accession Process – Conditionality - Constitutional Law - Non-Discrimination - 
European Union - Minority Rights - Minority Representation – Return - Reposession 
of Property. 
 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu Petričušić - Wind of Change 
Table of contents 
 
1. Introduction........................................................................... 5 
 
2. Nation Building that Neglected Minorities...................................... 6 
 
3. Change of Government, Change of Policy ...................................... 9 
 
4. Links between EU Integration Process and Minority Policy................11 
 
5. Establishment of a New Legal Framework for Minority Protection.......14 
 
6. Return and Reintegration of Refugees as Part of EU Conditionality .....16 
 
7. Concluding Remarks................................................................19 
 
 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu Petričušić - Wind of Change 
Wind of Change: The Croatian Government’s Turn 





After a decade of nationalist rule in Croatia, the change of government in 
2000 introduced a new political climate receptive to minorities with a better 
human and minority record, demonstrated commitment to regional co-
operation as well as the country’s willingness to cooperate with the Hague 
based International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter: 
ICTY).
1 This marked a turning point in relations between the European Union 
(hereinafter: EU) and Croatia. General public support for European integration 
had existed since the very beginning of the country’s independence in 1991. A 
cross-party consensus on the political goal of EU membership was formally 
declared in 2002, and continued after the change of Government in November 
2003.  
Minority ethnic communities made up almost 17% of population when 
Croatia proclaimed independence. The obvious need for a broad legislative 
framework for the protection and inclusion of minorities resulted in a set of 
laws guaranteeing their existence and preservation. Exploring legislation for 
the protection of national minorities in Croatia, the present paper 
demonstrates that the broad legislative framework was ineffectively 
implemented. 
In order to demonstrate the above argument, the amendments to legal 
documents will be traced and the mechanisms used for minority protection in 
Croatia will be analyzed. Particular emphasis will be placed on explaining how 
the change has impacted the rights of national minority members as the share 
of minority population as a portion of the overall population has drastically 
fallen. The prerequisite for the implementation of minority rights depends 
upon the existence of political will on the part of the government, which does 
not make much of difference, however, if not accompanied by a positive 
attitude towards minorities on the part of the majority population. This paper 
 
 
1   The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was established in 1993 by United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 827. It prosecutes violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia since 1991. For more information see 
http://www.un.org/icty/.The United Kingdom and the Netherlands had suspended parliamentary 
ratification of Croatian Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU due to concern about 
lack of country’s co-operation with the ICTY. 
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argues that a significant difference can be noted between the official policy 
towards minorities in 1990 and the minority policy pursued after the social 
democrat-liberal coalition took power in 2000. This article furthermore argues 
that the prospect of EU membership could serve as a catalyst for the 
improvement of minority rights in Croatia, namely for the return of Serb 
minority members who left the country in a great number in 1995, and aslo 
for the Roma, whose rights are generally advocated by the EU in the accession 
process. 
2. Nation Building that Neglected Minorities 
Croatia was one of six republics which comprised the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter: SFRY), a multi-ethnic federation with 
multiple national identities.
2  The basis for Croatian independence derives 
from the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY, which listed Croatia as one of six 
constituent republics (the others being Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia).
3 The first democratic elections held in 1990 
replaced the communist establishment by a nationalist bloc led by the 
Croatian Democratic Union (hereafter: HDZ), who called for Croatian 
sovereignty in what would be, at most, a loose confederal arrangement within 
Yugoslavia. Croatia eventually declared independence on 25 June 1991. The 
Parliament’s decision to abrogate of the state-legal ties with the SFRY was 
formally confirmed on 8 October 1991. However, the establishment of an 
electoral democracy was not accompanied by sufficient mechanisms to ensure 
the satisfactory protection of human rights for all the ethnic groups making up 
the population of the country.
4 The Serb minority that used to have a status of 
a constitutive nation in SFRY was granted the status of a national minority in 
newly independent Croatia. The majority of public servants of Serb ethnic 
origin were forced to leave their posts in the early 1990s. A few members of 
the Serb minority found employment in the private sector, but the dismissal 
of state employees of Serb origin has not been propoerly addresed since that 
time. The under-representation is most obvious in the judiciary, police force, 
medical practice and national education. Delays, arbitrary decisions and a 
 
 
2    Tibor Varady, “Minorities, Majorities, Law and Ethnicity: Reflections of the Yugoslav Case”, 19 
Human Rights Quarterly (1997), 9-54. 
3   Dusko Sekulic explains the dissolution of the SFRY as the outcome of the expansionist policy of the 
Serbian elite, which advocated the inclusion of all ethnic Serbs in one state. Stressing the 
importance of geostrategy, he claims that this policy was made possible because of the 
geostrategically weaker position of Croatia. See Dusko Sekulic, “The Creation and Dissolution of the 
Multinational State: the case of Yugoslavia”, 3(2) Nations and Nationalism (1997), 165-179. 
4   Tibor Varady, “Collective Minority Rights and Problems in Their Legal Protection: The Example of 
Yugoslavia”, 6(3) East European Politics and Societies (1992), 260-282. 
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lack of consistent procedure in citizenship granting were also regularly 
practiced towards certain minorities.
5  
An armed conflict resulting in the displacement of ethnic groups 
subsequently broke out, and one third of the country’s territory was occupied 
by the local Serbs and Yugoslav People’s Army.
6 Inter-ethnic conflict occurred 
not only because of the absence of cross-cutting religious factors but also 
because of several other factors: historical distrust between ethnic groups, 
accompanied by unequal economic distribution, alongside a liberalization 
movement for political pluralism promoted by new ethno-nationalist political 
elites.
7 Needless to say, the uprising of the Serb minority resulted in an anti-
Serbian sentiment among the public.
 Hate speech and collective pejorative 
generalizations that depreciated certain minorities were regularly used 
against the non-Croat population, particulalry Serbs and Muslims, against 
whom Croatia fought in the 1990s.
8  
The response of Croatian authorities to almost four years of occupation 
came in the spring and summer of 1995. The exodus of Serbs followed these 
military actions, and it is estimated that approximately 300,000 Serbs left 
Croatia in 1995. The lack of official efforts to stop this migration at that time, 
as well as the fact that tens of thousands of Serbian homes were looted and 
burnt by Croatian soldiers, put the burden of responsibility on the Croatian 
state. Croatia was accused of ethnic cleansing of its Serb population in the 
Krajina region. The Government’s statement was that Serbs had left Croatia 
after being organized by their leaders and before Croatian troops arrived into 
the liberated territory.
9 The Croatian Danube Region (Eastern Slavonia), also 
occupied by Serb rebels, was peacefully reintegrated in 1998. The legal basis 
for this was the internationally brokered Erdut Agreement of November 1995, 
which established the obligation of the Croatian government to guarantee all 
persons the right to return freely to their place of residence in the Croatian 
 
 
5   Croatian officials tried to defend their denial of granting citizenship to some non-Croats at the 
beginning of the nineties, claiming that “each of the former SFRY republics should be allowed to 
decide whether or not to grant citizenship to former SFRY citizens living in the republic in question 
and that this matter should be settled by bilateral agreements between the states of the former 
SFRY.” See Human Rights Watch Report on the Civil and Political Rights in Croatia, providing an 
overview of events that occurred in 1992-1995, at 10. See also Report of the Public Ombudsman to 
the Croatian Parliament (24 April 2002). 
6    See Marcus Tanner, Croatia. A Nation Forged in War (Yale University Press, New Haven, 
London, 1997). 
7   See Don Ronen, The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict, Democracy and Self-Determination in Central 
Europe (London/Portland, Frank Cass, 1997). See also Anthony Oberschall, “The Manipulation of 
Ethnicity: from Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia”, 23(6) Ethnic and Racial 
Studies (2000), 982-1001. See also Dusko Sekulic, “Civic and Ethnic Identity: The Case of Croatia”, 
27(3) Ethnic and Racial Studies (2004), 455-483. 
8   See Mariana Lenkova (ed.), “Hate Speech in the Balkans”, The International Helsinki Federation for 
Human Rights, 12, at http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/hatespeech.pdf. 
9   See Katarina Subašic, “Croatia: New Math”, 49(8) World Press Review (2002), at 
http://www.worldpress.org/. 
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Danube Region and to live there safely. In addition, the Agreement obliged 
the state to restore to these returning persons any property that had been 
taken from them unlawfully, or that they had been forced to abandon, and to 
provide a just compensation for property that could not be restored.
10 
In spite of the country’s silent political isolation in 1990s, a broad popular 
consensus on the necessity of European integration existed throughout 
1990s.
11 Formally, minority rights were set in a very extensive legislative 
package already at the beginning of 1990s. Nevertheless, a comprehensive 
human rights legislative framework was set up largely in response to pressure 
from the international community. Namely, the country’s legislation and 
human rights practices were scrutinized by various international bodies (the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (herinafter: OSCE) 
Mission to Croatia, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, the 
Council of Europe, the Venice Commission).
12 The issue of minority protection 
was first laid out in the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and 
the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities in the Republic of 
Croatia (hereinafter: Constitutional Law).
13 The acceptance of the minority 
law was a prerequisite for international recognition of Croatia as an 
independent state in January 1992. In accordance with the Constitutional 
Law, large minority groups, theoretically those that make up more than 8% of 
the population on the basis of the 1981 census were guaranteed proportional 
representation in the national parliament and promised considerable 
autonomy at the local level. Members of ethnic and national communities or 
minorities who made up less than 8% of the total Croatian population had the 
right to have at least five representatives in parliament. The Constitutional 
Law foresaw a territorial autonomy in the Serb-populated regions of Glina and 
Knin. The Serb minority, in this way, was offered legislative guarantee for 
establishment of two special autonomous districts (‘kotar’), with a special 
 
 
10    Complete text of the Erdut Agreement can be seen at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/croatia/ 
croatia_erdut_11121995.html. 
11   Ivo Sanader, “Croatia’s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership”, C59 ZEI Discussion Papers, 
(Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn, 1999), at http://www.zei.de/. 
12    See for example a series of OSCE’s Mission to Croatia status reports issued twice a year year, 
http://www.osce.org/croatia/. OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities issued several 
recommendations with respect of minority rights, at http://www.osce.org/hcnm/. The majority of 
opinions issued by the Venice Commission relates to the legislation that prescribes minority rights, 
e.g. Opinion 216/2002 Law on Rights of Minorities of Croatia; Opinion 174/2001 Local Elections - 
Minorities; Opinion 134/2000 Draft Constitutional Law on Rights of National Minorities; Opinion 
129/2000 Amendments to the Constitutional Law of 1991 on Human Rights and the Rights of 
Minorities; Opinion 19/1996 Application of the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Minority 
Rights, at http://www.venice.coe.int/. The Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities completed the review process for Croatia’s initial State Report 
in 2000, at http://www.coe.int/minorities/. 
13   Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of Ethnic and National 
Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, Official Gazette 65/91, 70/91, 27/92, 34/92, 
68 /95, 105/00. 
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self-administrating status.
14 In late September 1995, following the liberating 
military operations, the Parliament “temporarily” suspended those provisions 
of the Constitutional Law related to the Serb minority, whilst its general 
provisions and those representational provisions related to the smaller 
minority communities remained in force. On 11 May 2000, the Parliament 
amended the Constitutional Law, re-introducing some suspended provisions 
related to the proportional representation of the Serb minority, but annulling 
the vast majority related to Serb minority self-government.
15 
3. Change of Government, Change of Policy  
The parliamentary elections in January 2000, and the election of Stjepan 
Mesiċ as President of the Republic in February 2000, not only marked the end 
of the decade of international isolation, but also brought different policies 
towards the country’s minorities. In the first half of the year 2000, the 
Government took steps to improve cooperation with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and the international organizations that had 
missions in Croatia began to be downsized. For example, the Council of 
Europe decided to terminate its permanent monitoring of Croatia in 
September 2000, while the OSCE terminated its police monitoring group in the 
Eastern Slavonia in October 2000. 
In 2000, the new government agreed that actual respect for minority rights 
serves as a test of the degree to which democratization has occurred. A left-
centrist coalition under Prime Minister Ivica Račan declared, in its activity 
program, the aim to remove all the obstacles that prevent the full civil 
integration of members of national minorities into society. Very soon upon 
coming to power, the new government passed two important pieces of 
legislation that regulate rights of minorities to their own culture and 
language: the Law on the Use of Minority Languages and Scripts and the Law 
on Education Minority Languages.
16 Those two laws were passed after six years 
in the parliamentary procedure, since the previous assembly was unsuccessful 
in gaining the necessary votes in order to adopt laws.  
Although the Račan’s government declared that the country will accept the 
return of ethnic-Serb refugees who were driven out of their homes in 1995, a 
large infulx of returning Serbs has not taken place. The reason for a poor 
record in the implementation of the proclaimed policy of ethnic reconciliation 
 
 
14   See Nina Caspersen. “The Thorny Issue of Ethnic Autonomy in Croatia: Serb Leaders and Proposals 
for Autonomy”, 3 Journal on Ethnolopotics and Minority Issues in Europe (2003), at 
http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/. 
15   See Mirjana Domini, “National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia”, 12(19) Central Europe Review 
(2000), at http://www.ce-review.org/. 
16   Law on the Use of Language and Script of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia and Law on 
Education in the Language and Script of National Minorities, Official Gazette 51/00. 
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probably derives from insufficient support for the government’s policies at the 
local level. First, the left-centrist coalition government was not united at the 
lower levels of governance, and second in many municipalities and cities, 
governments were controlled by right-wing parties. The absence of political 
consensus significantly weakened the political determination to pursue 
policies of ethnic reconciliation, and constantly endangered the stability of 
the coalition.  
The 2003 elections constituted a move from formal guarantees of 
representation to implementation of arrangements ensuring effective 
participation of minorities in the political life of the state. Not only did the 
number of parliamentary minority representatives increase from five to eight, 
but minority representatives played a crucial role in setting up the new 
country’s government. Namely, winning only a relative majority, HDZ needed 
to gain support from minority representatives in order to obtain the new 
government’s mandate. Therefore, the HDZ sealed agreements with 
representatives of national minorities and offered them several positions in 
the administration, thus demonstrating that interethnic tensions are vanishing 
at the highest level, and that the country is moving towards a democratic 
consolidation.  
When the HDZ regained power in November 2003, many feared that a 
nationalistic oppression could return.
17 However, the new Prime Minister 
Sanader and the foreign minister Žužul used any given opportunity to 
demonstrate that the new government would pursue policies of ethnic 
reconciliation. Membership in the European Union and NATO, regional 
cooperation, developing economic diplomacy, and changing Croatia's 
international image are the five stated priorities of the foreign policy by the 
current HDZ Government. In February 2004, Croatia submitted the Second 
state report on the implementation of the Council of Europe’s Framework 
Convention. The report was prepared by Government bodies and national 
minority institutions and representatives. It focuses on the implementation of 
minority legislation, and summarizes Government-sponsored activities aimed 
at preserving minority culture, education, language and customs. The report 
stated that minority rights have been greatly improved, especially in the 
legislative sphere and in exercising the right to minority culture and language. 
Nevertheless, the report recognizes existing impediments that limit national 
minorities from fully exercising their rights, particularly in the areas of 
employment and the reconstruction of devastated property in post-conflict 
 
 
17   See Romana Vlahutin, “The Croatian exception”, in Judy Batt (ed.) The Western Balkans moving on 
(The European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 21-35, at 28-30, at http://www.iss-
eu.org/chaillot/chai70.pdf. 
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areas.
18 In addition to the state report, two minority  NGO prepared the 
shadow report for the implementation period 1999 – 2004. While the state 
report deals mostly to the legislative framework of minority protection, the 
shadow reports points towards the difficulties minority members are facing in 
everyday life.
19 
Bilateral agreement on the protection of national minorities signed with 
Serbia and Montenegro in November 2004 additionally contributes to the 
stabilization of the good neighborly relations and enhances the stability of the 
region. Croatia signed already in 1990s similar bilateral minority protection 
agreements with Italy and Hungary. 
4. Links between EU Integration Process and Minority Policy 
The Copenhagen European Council of June 1993 stated that those candidate 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (hereinafter: CEE) which wish to 
become members of the Union must meet a number of conditions relating to 
the political and economic spheres. One of these conditions is respect for and 
protection of minorities.
20 The Feira Council of June 2000 agreed that all 
Western Balkans countries were eligible for potential membership in the 
Union. In addition, the EU declared that the accession conditions foessen for 
CEE countries would bind all the Western Balkans countries in their 
integration process. The Croatian government was thus aware that inadequate 
minority policy would prevent the country from integration. Furthermore, a 
clear signal that each of the Western Balkan countries would gain access 
individually was declared at the Zagreb summit in 2000, and reiterated at the 
European Council of June 2003 in Thessaloniki, Greece, endowing Croatia with 
optimism for its European integration. 
The nationalist politics pursued in the 1990s, accompanied by inadequate 
progress in democratization, respect for human and minority rights and rule of 
law, kept the EU from establishing relations with Croatia. The change of 
government in 2000 presented the opportunity for rapid progress in the 
relationship between Croatia and the European Union. Croatia signed a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (hereinafter: SAA) in October 2001, 
 
 
18   Second Report submitted by Croatia pursuant to Article 25(1) of the Framework Convention for he 
Protection of National Minorities, ACFC/SR/II(2004)002 (April 2004), at http://www.coe.int/ 
minorities/. 
19   The shadow report was prepared by the Center for Peace, Legal Advice and Psyhosocial Assistance 
from the city of Vukovar and Community of Serbs from the city of Rijeka. The text of the shadow 
report in Croatian language can be found at http://www.chez.com/zsr/. The English verion of the 
report can be found in the Minority Rights Information System data base (MIRIS), at 
http://www.eurac.edu/miris/.  
20   Snježana Vasiljeviċ, “The legal aspects of protection of minorities in the process of stabilisation and 
association”, in Katarina Ott (ed.), Croatian Accession to the European Union, Institutional 
Challenges (Institute of Public Finance, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Zagreb, 2004), 249-272. 
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thus demonstrating progress in the Stabilization and Association process.
21 The 
Agreement serves as a powerful mechanism for needed legislative reforms in 
the fields of human and minority rights, since it obliges the country to bring 
the legislation relating to those issues into line with the acquis 
communautaire. Conditions fullfiled at this stage of the integration do not yet 
relate to legal standards, but rather to economics and politics.
22 The vast 
majority of legislative amendments will therefore happen only during an 
accession process in order to bring the country’s legislation into line with the 
EU  acquis.
23 The issue of minority protection falls under the scope of the 
political criteria that are ussually required to be fullfilled prior to the start of 
accession negotiations. Furthermore, respect for human rights has 
been  introduced as an essential element of EU external agreements since 
1995. Introducing human rights protection as a part of pre-acession 
conditionality, the EU has maintained the right to suspend all or part of an 
agreement if a partner country does not fulfil its human rights obligations.
24 In 
both the premable and Article 2 of the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement,  the clear reference to respect for human rights,  including  the 
rights of persons belonging to national minorities, is made. This requirement 
could maintain and enhance human and particulalry minority rights standards 
and their implementation in Croatia. Article 120 paragraph 2 of the SAA 
contains a suspension clause which foresees that each party to the 
Agreement could take appropriate measures if it considered that the other 
Party failed to fulfil an obligation under the agreement.
25 
In December 2002, all parliamentary political parties adopted a resolution 
that defined Croatia’s accession to the EU as a strategic national goal. 
Application for membership was submitted in February 2003. The current 
government, which took power in November 2003, listed membership in the 
European Union as one of its priorities. The European Commission issued an 
Opinion on Croatia’s application for membership of the European Union in 
April 2004.
26 The Opinion recommended the initiation of accession 
 
 
21   The Stabilization and Association process is a current EU strategy for the Western Balkans, gathering 
besides Croatia, four other countries of the region (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and 
Serbia and Montenegro). It is based on a credible prospect of membership once the relevant 
conditions have been met. For more information see Christian Pippan, “The Rocky Road to Europe: 
The EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western Balkans and the Principle of 
Conditionality”, 9(2) European Foreign Affairs Review (2004), 219-245. 
22   Siniša Rodin, “Croatian Accession to the European Union: the Transformation of the Legal System”, 
in Ott (ed.), Croatian Accession …, 224. 
23   See “The EU’s relations with Croatia”, at http://europa.eu.int/. 
24   See Vaughne Miller, “The Human Rights Clause in the EU’s External Agreements”, 4(33) Research 
Paper of the House of Commons Library (2004), at http://www.parliament.uk/. See also Mielle 
Bulterman,  Human Rights in the Treaty Relations of the European Community: Real Virtues or 
Virtual Reality? (School of Human Rights Research series, Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2001). 
25   See Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and its Member 
States and the Republic of Croatia, at http://europa.eu.int/. 
26   See the European Commission’s Opinion on the application of Croatia for membership of the 
European Union, 37, at http://europa.eu.int/. 
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negotiations with Coatia. Eventually, the European Council agreed that the 
country met the political set of Copenhagen Criteria, and the country was 
awarded a candidate status on 18 June 2004. Brussels’ decision made it 
obvious that the country has moved away from destructive nationalism. 
Therefore, Croatia’s application for membership serves as a positive example 
for the other countries of the region on how a defeat of nationalist politics 
enhances EU accession, possibly inspiring them to speed up necessary 
reforms.
27  
The Commission’s Opinion iter alia analyses the situation in respect to 
political conditions (democracy, rule of law, human rights, protection of 
minorities) including the fulfillment of the Stabilizations and Association 
Process conditionalities. The Opinion found no major problems regarding the 
assurance of rule of law and respect for fundamental rights. However, it 
emphasized that the country has to take measures to ensure that the rights of 
minorities, in particular the Serb minority, are fully respected. Consequently, 
the Opinion urges Croatia to speed up its implementation of the Constitutional 
Law on National Minorities and accelerate efforts to facilitate the return of 
Serb refugees from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The Opinion of the Commission has found that minorities and issues of their 
concern have been increasingly, albeit not yet adequately, covered over 
recent years, both in electronic media and in the press. In spite of a visible 
decline in hate speech in the media, national minorities are perceived and 
presented as separate entities and not as an integral part of society. 
Furthermore, the Commission urges implementation of legislative provisions 
that oblige public radio and TV stations to broadcast programs in minority 
languages at the national and local levels. The Commission finds no indication 
that there has been any court verdict establishing discrimination against 
minorities or criminal guilt for spreading racial hatred. However, it advocates 
proper minority representation in state administrative and judicial bodies. 
The Government, referring to practical difficulties of the judiciary, the 
constraints of the state budget and the independence of courts in selecting 
judges, has not developed a programme to remedy under-representation in 
the long term. The Law on State Administration, the Law on Courts, the Law 
on the State Judicial Council and the Law on the State Prosecutor’s Office 
have to be brought in line with the Constitutional Law on Minorities. Similar to 
Regular Reports on the progress towards accession of Central and Estern 
European candiate countries, the Commission exspressed concern about the 
actual integration of the Roma minority into public life. The Commission 
hence argues that the Roma minority very often face discriminatory 
 
 
27   Nicole Lindstrom, “European Integration and Ethnic Reconciliation in Croatia and Serbia”, Woodrow 
Wilson International Center For Scholars’ East European Studies’ News, Meeting Report 295 
(May/June 2004), at http://wwics.si.edu/. See also Vlahutin, “The Croatian exception”… . 
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treatments not only when seeking employment, but also when addressing 
health and educational services. Unofficial estimates say that there might be 
up to 40,000 Roma living in Croatia.  
5. Establishment of a New Legal Framework for Minority 
Protection  
Assessing the implementation of the Framework Convention in Croatia, the 
Committee of Ministers of Council of Europe noticed in 2002 certain normative 
improvements, but asserted that there were “a number of inadequacies in the 
legal framework concerning the protection of national minorities.”
28 The 
Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities in the Republic of 
Croatia
29 was finally adopted on 13 December 2002, again coming into being in 
response to pressure from the international community.
30 It sets the domestic 
legal framework for minority rights in Croatia, and is based on the 
internationally established minority protection standards. The Law was passed 
as an organic law, and gained almost unanimous support from all preliminary 
representatives. An apparent advantage of the new Law is that it serves all 
minorities, unlike the previous one which primarily addressed the largest 
minority group, namely Serbs. The Law contains a number of provisions that 
guarantee the full respect of the principles of non-discrimination outlined in 
various international agreements; protection against any activities which 
could endanger the existence of any minority or community; the right to 
protect their identity, culture and religion; public and private use of national 
minority’s language and script; and the right to education and equal 
participation. In addition, it guarantees the exercise of certain rights and 
freedoms, depending on the numerical representation of the members of 
national minorities in the Republic of Croatia or in one of its areas. It 
authorizes, however, the units of local self-government to opt for the official 
use of two of more languages and scripts, taking into account the size of any 
national minority or community.  
The 2001 Census indicated a drop in number of almost all national 
minorities represented in population.
31 Ethnic Croats represent approximately 
90% of the total population in comparison to 78% ten years ago, while national 
minorities make up 7.47% of the total population. This drop is particularly 
sharp in a case of the Serb ethnic group, since its share of population has 
 
 
28   The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers Resolution ResCMN (2002)1 on the implementation 
of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Croatia, adopted on 
6 February 2002 at the 782nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, at http://www.coe.int/cm/. 
29    Constitutional Law on Human Rights of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, Official 
Gazette 155/2002. 
30   For detailed disposition of the Constitutional Law see Antonija Petričušić, “Croatian Constitutional 
Law on the Rights of National Minorities”, 2 European Yearbook of Minority Issues (2002/03), 
607-629. 
31   See Subašic, “Croatia: New Math” ... . 
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decreased dramatically from 13% to 4.5%.
32 The Census listed only those 
citizens who had not been absent from the country for more than one year. 
The results of the 2001 Census have implications regarding political rights at 
the national and regional levels. Namely, the Constitutional Law guarantees a 
certain number of seats in the Parliament and in the bodies of local self-
government to minorities. Therefore, it was necessary to include a provision 
in the Constitutional Law on Minorities that prescribed a possibility of data 
adjustment prior to elections. For example, prior to each election, the official 
census results on the number of members of national minorities at the local or 
regional levels shall be adapted to eventual changes as recorded in the last 
confirmed voter’s list. In this way, representation of minorities in the 
Croatian parliament, executive bodies and local representative bodies will not 
be frozen at the level which would be dictated by the results of the 2001 
Census, and possible returnees will be included in public life of the country. 
The Constitutional Law, as a framework law, regulates only fundamental 
rights, while technical issues such as the exercise of political rights 
guaranteed to minorities are regulated by the amended electoral legislation. 
The Electoral Law provides for proportional representation and assures three 
seats for the Serb minority, one seat each for Italian and one for Hungarian 
minorities, while other minorities are divided into two groups of which each is 
entitled to elect one representative. Minority representatives are elected in a 
special constituency, while the rest of population votes in ten electoral 
constituencies.  
At the state as well as local levels, minorities have the right to have 
representatives in elected bodies as well as judicial and administrative bodies 
of municipalities and cities. The last nation-wide local elections took place in 
May 2001, and nationalist parties made significant gains in some areas. Upon 
the elections, police intervention was required in some cases, as ethnic Croat 
nationalist demonstrators tried to keep elected Croatian Serbs from assuming 
office.
33 According to the Constitutional Law on National Minorities, by-
elections have been neccessary in those counties and municipalities where not 
enough minority representatives were elected in the previous local elections. 
In spite of the March 2003 deadline set by Constitutional Law for the local by-
elections, they were only held on 15 February 2004. 
 
 
32   Demographers argue that the drop in all segments of population can not be observed simply as a 
result of the ethnic conflict that took place in 1990s. Not denying the fact that mass migration of 
ethnic Serbs took place, demographic trends have also changed significantly due to about 10,000 
war-related casualties, remarkable refugee flow into Croatia from Bosnia-Herzegovina and other 
conflicted areas in Balkans, along with the significant number of people who voluntary migrated to 
other countries due to the better economic situation they expected to find there. See Anđelko 
Akrap, Jakov Gelo and Marinko Grizelj, “Population Size of the Republic of Croatia and Its Counties 
According to Age and Gender from the 1991 Census to 1998”, 43/44(5-6) Društvena istraživanja 
(1999), 677-919. 
33   See Human Rights Watch World Report 2002, at http://www.hrw.org/. 
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The specificity of the new Constitutional Law on Minorities is that it 
established the possibility of minority self-government in local self-
government units. National minority councils and representatives serve as 
advisory bodies to local and regional governments that are obliged to consult 
those councils when passing a legislative act which might affect the rights of 
minorities. In order to ensure proper functioning of elected minority councils, 
the state is obliged to provide adequate funding. All Croatian citizens 
declared as members of sixteen national minority communities at the 2001 
Census are entitled to elect minority councils and representatives at the local 
and regional levels. The provisions of the Law for the Local Elections were 
applied in the first elections for national minority councils, which took place 
in May 2003, and at additional elections held in February 2004. In both cases, 
turnout of minority member voters was low. The reason for such low minority 
participation was probably the fact that councils are a new institution, so 
minority members were improperly acquainted with their mandate. 
Furthermore, minority associations complained that they were given a short 
preparation period for the electoral campaigns. The Ministry of Justice is 
preparing a draft law on the election of councils of national minorities and 
individual minority representatives.  
The Government was advised by the European Commission in the pre-
accession period to continue improving the situation of the Roma through 
strengthened implementation of the relevant strategy, including the provision 
of necessary financial support at the national and local levels, anti-
discrimination measures aimed at fostering employment opportunities, and 
increasing access to education and improving housing conditions. The Croatian 
Government adopted a National Program for the Roma in October 2003 
addressing issues such as status, political representation at local level, 
employment, children’s rights, education, health care, social welfare, housing 
and environmental protection. In April 2004 the Government established a 
Commission to monitor the implementation of the National Programme for the 
Roma. The Commission gathers representatives of the Government, NGOs and 
the Roma minority, and its aim is to develop a unified action plan by 15 
December 2004. 
6. Return and Reintegration of Refugees as Part of EU 
Conditionality 
The issue of minorities in the case of Croatia is inevitably linked to the return 
and reintegration of the Serb minority that left the territory of the state 
following the two military actions of the Croatian army in 1995, finding 
shelter primarily in neighbouring Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
return of minority population and the repossession of their property are not 
commonly recognized as minority rights, but in Croatia’s case they are 
intrinsically linked to the human rights of Serb minority and continue to 
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present the most sensitive political issue in the country. Economic 
underdevelopment and high levels of unemployment in parts of Croatia 
traditionally inhabited by members of Serb minority prevent refugees from 
returning because in many cases they could not find employment upon return. 
Although the right to housing represents a fundamental human right, many 
Serb refugees from Croatia who would like to return are still not able to do 
so, because they once had occupancy rights to dwellings, and this right has 
since been abolished. In addition, their return is made more difficult by 
discrimination demonstrated towards Serbs in the dealings of local courts in 
previous war zones. Namely, those lower courts issued a large number of war 
crime convictions for ethnic Serbs which still have not been overturned by the 
Supreme Court, in spite of a general Amnesty Law that was passed in 1996. 
The Law on Reconstruction adopted in 1996 set the criteria for 
Government’s funding for reconstruction.
34 Eligibility criteria, in fact, 
discriminated against Serb applicants. In June 2000, the Parliament amended 
the Law removing most of the deficiencies. Equal reconstruction standards 
have been guaranteed, in the sense that the reconstruction-based rights 
depend exclusively on the degree of damages and the number of family 
members who would return and live in the reconstructed house. The 
Government has launched the Program for Return and Accommodation of 
Displaced Persons, Refugees and Resettled Persons (hereafter: the Return 
Program) in June 1998.
35 The key principle under the Return Program was 
property repossession by pre-war owners, without discrimination based on the 
ethic origin. However, the Return Program made repossession by owners 
dependent upon the condition of providing alternative accommodation for the 
temporary residents, which caused its slow implementation. Additionally, at 
the local level, authorities have continued to deny reconstruction assistance 
to individuals whose property was damaged or destroyed by so-called 
‘terrorist acts’ (in reality, by the Croatian armed forces). The European Court 
of Human Rights in Strasbourg ruled against Croatia for having suspended the 
article in the Law on Obligations which prescribed the responsibility of the 
State to compensate damage caused by terrorist acts.
36 Subsequently, the 
state has undertaken a commitment to finance restoration of houses looted by 
Croatian soldiers in 1995. 
The unconditional return of all refugees, regardless of their ethnicity, and 
the return of their property were placed at the top of current government’s 
 
 
34   Law on Reconstruction, Official Gazette 24/96, 54/96, 87/96, 57/00. 
35    Ida Elizabeth Koch, “Protection of Property Rights in the Republic of Croatia: The Law on the 
Temporary take-over and Administration of Specified Property”, 4 Helsinki Monitor (1997), 28-45. 
36   ECtHR, Appl. No. 48778/99, Vojin and Ana Kutic v Republic of Croatia, judgment of 1 March 2002, 
at http://www.echr.coe.int/. 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu 
17Petričušić - Wind of Change 
list of priorities.
37 Approximately 120,000 Serbian refuge returns were 
registered since the end of the war, and the vast majority of returnees are old 
people. Serb returnees still occasionally face problems in acquiring 
citizenship, work contracts and retirement payments. Ethnic Serbs who 
returned face discrimination in the administration of justice, employment, 
housing, and sometimes even in freedom of movement. Intimidation and 
verbal assaults of Serb returnees were reported in the central Dalmatia and 
Krajina regions. In the Danube region, most of the provisions of the Erdut 
Agreement have been implemented, with the important exception of 
proportional representation of Serbs in the judiciary. At the same time, ethnic 
Croat returnee associations and local authorities have accused some ethnic 
Serb leaders of encouraging ethnic hatred.  
One of the first concrete steps in the minority protection sphere was the 
launch of a public awareness campaign aimed at encouraging refugees to 
return to their pre-war homes. This project is a joint initiative by the 
government, the OSCE, and other international organizations. This measure 
has a direct connection to the prospect of integration, since the refugee 
return efforts were listed under the key political criteria that Croatia must 
meet to gain eventual membership in the EU. However, the numbers speak 
against government’s plan. Namely, a survey conducted for the purposes of 
the campaign disclosed that only 15 per cent of interviewed Serb refugees 
now living in Serbia and Bosnia wanted to return to Croatia.
38 The majority of 
them have already been granted citizenship in Serbia and Montenegro, and 
forty percent own an apartment or house in another country. Among the main 
reasons that they listed for not returning were concerns that their children 
would not have the same opportunities in Croatia. Many refugees fear that 
their living conditions would deteriorate in Croatia, and some fear 
discrimination, harassment and loss of ethnic identity, suspecting that the 
local community would not accept them. Some of them fear that local war 
crimes indictments may include the names of innocent people. Similarly, 
ethnic Croatian refugees from Bosnia who now occupy Serb dwellings 
demonstrated even greater reluctance to return to their prewar homes in 
Bosnia. A glimpse of hope offers a belief of an overwhelming majority of both 
Serbs and Croats, 80% of respondents, believe that coexistence is possible. 
However, the majority of Croats (63% of those living in war-affected areas and 
47% of those living elsewhere) still do not think that the return of Serbs would 
be a good thing for the country. When they were asked for reasons of such an 
 
 
37   Croatia was one of signatory parties of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina of December 1995 which inter alia guaranteed the right of all refugees to return to 
their pre-war homes. The full text of the Agreement is available at 
http://www.oscebih.org/essentials/gfap/eng/home.asp. 
38   Survey conducted by agency ‘Puls’ commissioned by the OSCE and the Croatian government, 
published on 15 September 2004, at http://www.osce.org/Croatia/. 
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attitude, fear that returning would increase negative development or the 
reemergence of a conflict were most often listed as answers. The generally 
bad economic situation in war-affected areas was stated as another reason for 
hesitance in supporting return of the Serb minority. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
The implementation of international commitments for minority protection was 
complicated by the 1991-1995 ethnic conflict in Croatia. Relations between 
the Croatian majority and the Serb minority are still, almost ten years after 
the termination of the conflict, burdened by the legacy of the conflict. Ethnic 
tensions in the war-affected areas remain high, and ethnically motivated 
harassment and assaults have not yet vanished. However, normative 
improvements have indeed occurred in the last few years, being welcomed by 
international monitors as a demonstration of political maturity of the country. 
After the change of the government in 2000, three important laws were 
passed: first, two laws on the education in minority languages and on the use 
of minority language and script and second, the Constitutional Law on 
National Minorities that set the general framework for minority protection. 
The adoption of this legislation represents a realization of Croatia’s 
obligations towards the international community, and constituted an 
important step in its way towards European integration. 
The granting of candidate status to Croatia in June 2004 was a sign that the 
EU appreciates fulfillment of pre-accession conditionality requirements. Apart 
from a commitment to regional cooperation and cooperation with the Hague 
tribunal, minority protection falls under the scope of conditions to be fulfilled 
prior to the integration process. The initiated EU accession process would 
probably enhance the implementation of minority rights related to Serb 
minority returnees as well as Roma, since those are the two minorities the EU 
is particularly paying attention to, and requires active undertaking of the 
state in assuring a better accommodation of minorities. The most important 
aspect of the accession process is that it honors concrete acts and not mere 
political declarations. For that reason, all minorities stand to benefit form the 
European integration process as minority protection remains a field in which 
Croatia needs to make additional efforts in the accession period. The state is 
still obliged to assure proportional representation of minorities in local and 
regional self government units, as well as in the state administration and 
judicial bodies.  
The process of refugee return, another relevant part of the political 
criteria for accession, requires not only proper and non-discriminatory 
legislation, but also financial backing by the state. The recently launched 
return campaign demonstrates that the state is willing to commit itself to the 
implementation of this requirement. However, the campaign may have 
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arrived a bit too late, since the majority of refugees have managed to set up 
in neighbouring countries and seem unlikely to return to their pre-war homes. 
Perhaps the candidacy (and eventual member state status) of Croatia might 
serve as a stimulus for refugee return, because it is unlikely that the 
neighburing countries in which Serb refugees reside will be able to catch up 
Croatia’s acccession course. In this way, the integration process may 
contribute to the adjustment of Croatia’s ethnic picture back to its condition 
of the beginning of 1990s.  
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